From High School to Work in Japan: Lessons for the United States? by Brinton, Mary
 




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Brinton, Mary C. 1998. From high school to work in Japan:
Lessons for the United States? Social Service Review 72(4): 442-
451.
Published Version doi:10.1086/515773
Accessed February 17, 2015 11:33:15 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203028
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAFrom High School to
Work in Japan: Lessons
for the United States?
TheSocial Service Review Lecture
Mary C. Brinton
Cornell University
Youth employment problems have received considerable public andscholarlyattention
in the United States in recent years. A chief concern is the worsening situation of high
school–educated youth versus their college-educated counterparts in terms of wages,
turnover rates, and unemployment. Japan has been cited as an example of a country
that demonstrates how high school–employer linkages can facilitate the successfuland
stable transition from high school to work. This article explains this system of linkages
and critically evaluates its operation and results.
The problems of American urban public high schools have received
much popular and scholarly attention in recent years. High rates of ab-
senteeism, high dropout rates, and a widening wage gap between high
school and college graduates present a troubling picture of the educa-
tional and labor market fates of many young people. Japan has often
been cited in the context of these discussions as an example of a country
with a well-established, efﬁcient system of connecting new high school
graduates to employers; such a system purportedly motivates students
to perform well in high school so that they can be recommended for
the ‘‘good’’ jobs in the local economy.1 But despite strong interest, there
is an embarrassing paucity of empirical studies on the process through
which Japanese high school graduates apparently move smoothly into
niches in the economy and a paucity as well of studies that evaluate the
positive and negative aspects of that process. Such a scarcity makes policy
recommendations for the United States based on the Japanese case dif-
ﬁcult at best and risky at worst.
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0037-7961/98/7204-0001$02.00In this article, I ask whether the Japanese system holds the key to estab-
lishing a successful transition from high school to work and to ameliorat-
ing associated problems in the labor market for less educated youth in
the United States or whether the Japanese system is a mirage for U.S.
educational analysts and policy makers. Because I report research in
progress, my central purpose here is to stimulate thinking on this ques-
tion rather than to attempt a deﬁnitive answer. I draw on ﬁeldwork and
data collection conducted in Japan in fall 1995, winter 1996, and again
in fall 1997. Although this article can only reﬂect a small portion of the
research, it is my intent to convey some of the complexities that should
be considered in arguments for transposing the highly structured Japa-
nese system to the American context.
American High School Graduates in the Labor Market
In recent years, a number of issues have become increasingly salient in
the youth labor market in the United States, especially in industrial cities
of the midwest and northeast that historically had a high concentration
of manufacturing jobs. Labor economists have shown that the 1980s wit-
nessed a substantial decline in the real wages of low-skilled, male workers
(high school graduates or dropouts) and a widening gap between the
wages of these workers and university graduates.2 Low-skilled workers
also show much higher probabilities of unemployment than high-skilled
workers.Economistshavesuggestedanumberofreasonsforthesetrends.
Major structural changes in the American economy include the move-
ment of manufacturing jobs to countries with lower labor costs and the
bifurcation of the service sector into high-paying, knowledge-intensive
jobs, on the one hand, and low-paying, low-skill, monotonous jobs, on
the other.
The increasing disparity between the labor market fates of highly edu-
cated and less educated workers is much less evident in Japan.3 The wage
gap is not as wide as in the United States nor are educational differentials
in employment rates. Japan’s labor force appears to be better able to ab-
sorb people at the lower end of the educational spectrum, people who
have increasingly fallen out of the system in the United States and have
become unemployed or employed in very low-wage jobs. Moreover, few
Japanese enter the workplace without a high school education. About
95 percent of Japanese youth currently graduate from high school, the
vast majority doing so within 3 years. The ﬁgure for the United States
hovers around 85 percent (including General Equivalency Diplomas
[GED]) and is lower still in major urban areas.
Some observers have claimed that Japan’s ability to absorb less edu-
cated youth into the economy and the high rates of high school com-
pletion are not coincidental phenomena. Recently, a number of Ameri-
can scholars and educational policy makers have credited Japanese high
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nisms through which the transition from high school to work is carried
out. In particular, attention has been paid to the implicit contracts that
Japanese high schools have with local employers to hire some of their
graduates each year. Comparative survey data indicate that Japanese
high school seniors are about 4.5 times as likely as their American coun-
terparts to ﬁnd their ﬁrst post-high school, full-time job with the assis-
tance of their school.4 Japanese high school students’ job search is also
more focused within one ﬁeld or industry than is the case for Americans.
Also, by the end of the school year, Japanese high schools typically report
perfect or near-perfect job placement rates for their non-college-bound
graduating seniors.
Does Japan, therefore, offer a solution to organizing and managing
the youth labor market in the United States? This is both a very impor-
tant policy question and an important theoretical question. This point is
made by James Rosenbaum and Takehiko Kariya in the seminal article
in English on the Japanese transition from high school to work: ‘‘Free
markets are the basis of youth employment policy in the U.S. For match-
ing youth to jobs, we trust markets and mistrust institutions. We accept
the market assumption that hiring is best done directly between youth
and employers, while intervening institutions (like schools) are viewed
as bureaucratic, unresponsive to productivity needs, and easily distorted
by political pressure.’’5 In other words, if a highly managed job-matching
process truly is a better way of organizing the labor market, there are
many implications regarding the positive role that institutions can play
in the labor market. The Japanese example is a good test case.
From High School to Work, Japanese Style
Currently, about 40 percent of graduating Japanese high school seniors
matriculate to junior colleges or universities. Another 35 percent either
become ronin (literally, ‘‘masterless samurai,’’ students who study for at
least one additional year to retake university entrance examinations) or
attend senmon gakko, private 2-year schools that offer training in special-
ized subjects, ranging from fashion design to computer science. The re-
maining 25 percent or so of students go directly into the labor market.
In order to recruit new junior high school or high school graduates,
Japanese employers are legally required to provide a detailed descrip-
tion of their job openings to the local public employment security ofﬁce.
Given that Japan has achieved near-universal rates of advancement to
high school, this legal framework now applies mainly to work-bound
high school seniors. Job listing forms are standardized nationally and can
be submitted by employers any time after June 20 each year for openings
available to students graduating and entering the labor market the fol-
444 Social Service Reviewlowing spring. (The Japanese school year typically ends in early February,
and new graduates begin employment in April.) The public employment
security ofﬁce must approve the job description and working conditions,
and employers are permitted from July onward to deliver personally or
to send the notices of job openings to high schools from which they are
interested in recruiting. Teachers in the career guidance section of each
school then counsel work-bound students as to the appropriateness of
speciﬁc companies and jobs for them.6
Students cannot contact employers or apply directly to jobs; rather,
they must receive their school’s recommendation before being invited
for an interview by the employer. Most schools will select only one stu-
dent to recommend for a given job in order to forestall direct competi-
tion between multiple students for the most desirable jobs. Even so, com-
petition can occur between students at different schools if the employer
has submitted multiple copies of the job opening notice to different
schools. The school recommendations are forwarded to ﬁrms beginning
in early September, at which point the interviewing and selection pro-
cess begins. Informal employment commitments can only legally be an-
nounced after October 1.
To an outside observer, it may seem puzzling how employers select
schools from which to attempt labor recruitment. An important point to
keep in mind is that students have already been extensively sorted at the
point of high school entrance, and student ability at individual schools
is, therefore, much more homogeneous than is the case in the United
States.7 Compulsory education in Japan ends with junior high school,
and admission to public high school is governed largely by one’s score
on the prefectural standardized entrance examination and, to a lesser
extent, by junior high school grades. Within each school district, there
is a ﬁnely graded hierarchy of public, general academic high schools.
There are also private academic high schools and public vocational high
schools. Consideration for admission to these is not governed by resi-
dence in the local school district as is the case with the public, general
academic high schools.
Public knowledge about the ‘‘quality’’ of different high schools is
very extensive. Private publishing companies release statistics on the
minimum standardized test scores for students entering different high
schools, which is the best single indicator of a school’s academic qual-
ity. The government publishes a thick volume of statistics each year on
the number of university-bound and work-bound students at every high
school in the nation, and this gives employers a very accurate picture of
which schools will have large numbers of seniors looking for jobs.
The job placement rate for graduating seniors is typically very high or
perfect by the time the senior cohort graduates, a point to which I return
below. It thus appears that the highly structured process accomplishes
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graduation. But is this truly the case? And if so, how and why does the
process work so well?
How to Measure ‘‘Success’’
Efﬁcient Job Placement
To evaluate the enviable record of Japanese high schools’ job placement
for graduates, as well as a number of other statistics, it is necessary to
consider how the ﬁgures are calculated. My ﬁeldwork in Japan involved
visits to 20 urban public high schools, including 14 general academic
high schools and six industrial vocational high schools. My research in-
dicates that there are important differences in the transition from high
school to work for general and vocational schools, yet American percep-
tions of the Japanese situation have not distinguished between these two
settings. For that reason, I restrict my focus to materials gathered in gen-
eral academic high schools.
The general academic schools in my sample rank in the bottom one-
third of schools in their districts in terms of the minimum standardized
test scores required for entrance. As some Japanese informants com-
mented to me, students at these schools are, in some sense, equivalent
to dropouts in the American high school system; they have performed at
lowlevelsintheirschoolcareersofarandareveryunlikelytoprogresson
to university. Whereas the top schools in each district may send 50 per-
cent of their students to university (and many more if one includes
ronin), the schools I visited typically send only 2–5 percent of their
graduates to university. They are, thus, an apt comparison with those ur-
ban American high schools that have low rates of student advancement
to higher education. Three-quarters of the schools in my sample are in
the Yokohama and Kawasaki areas of Kanagawa prefecture, southwest of
Tokyo. This area was chosen because it has traditionally been a manu-
facturing area and, therefore, constitutes a good comparison with large
midwestern cities in the United States in terms of recent deindustriali-
zation trends. The other one-fourth of schools are in Miyagi prefecture,
northeast of Tokyo; I exclude these from this article.
The schools in my sample provide ample evidence of the diversity of
student outcomes among Japanese high schools and also reveal the sur-
prising paucity of information that exists about a certain segment of
the graduates from low-ranking schools. There is little regional variance
in Japan’s high school dropout rate but considerable variance within a
givenschooldistrict.Atnoneofthehighschoolsinmysampledidschool
ofﬁcials provide statistics on dropping out, but some teachers rather sur-
reptitiously pointed out to me that I could estimate such ﬁgures from the
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list sophomore, junior, and senior class sizes. Although American observ-
ers generally comment only on the low average dropout rate in Japan
(around 6%), the rates at the high schools I visited reach as high as 15–
20 percent. This remains far lower than rates for the most troubled of
American urban public high schools but is much higher than the nation-
wide Japanese average and, therefore, calls into question the standard
American interpretation of highly successful Japanese schooling.
Regional and national statistics on the job placement rate published
by the Ministry of Labor give the impression of high schools’ unquali-
ﬁed success in launching work-bound students into the labor market,
with placement rates often reaching 100 percent. Several teachers in my
sampled schools noted that high schools are legally required to send
monthly ﬁgures to the local public employment agency showing the
number of incipient graduating seniors for whom they were able to ﬁnd
jobs. Students with strong academic records and good interviewing skills
typically are successfully placed early in the year so that as time wears on,
those remaining are the students who are harder to place. In the later
months of the senior year, the placement ﬁgures decline as students be-
come discouraged. At some point, some of these students give up their
job search and decide either to go on tosenmon gakko or to look for a job
on their own. In such cases, it is possible that the guidance section of the
school will remove them from the category of ‘‘job seekers,’’ thus, remov-
ing them from the denominator used to calculate placement statistics.
This artiﬁcially inﬂates the success rate just as the removal of ‘‘discour-
aged workers’’ from the calculation of an unemployment rate would
make that rate much lower than it otherwise would be.
It is not immediately clear where job-seeking students who dropped
out of the process ultimately appear in the statistics. In the education
guidebooks issued by private publishers for public consumption, up to
40 percent of the graduating seniors in some schools are listed as ‘‘ronin,
etc.’’ At the top-ranked schools, the majority of this 40 percent are in-
deed ronin, but at the bottom schools, the vast majority are instead in
the ‘‘etc.’’ category—students who neither found jobs with the help of
their school nor are higher education bound. It is probable that some of
these students will have entered low-skilled part-time or even full-time
jobs in the service sector without help from their teachers even before
leaving school. The majority of high schools I visited either had a pro-
hibition against students working while they were still enrolled or had
had such a prohibition in the recent past. However, teachers frankly ex-
plained to me that despite this restriction, the majority of students in
their schools were employed inarubeito (part-time jobs) or even full-time
evening jobs. These jobs include legitimate ones as well as lucrative but
less socially acceptable jobs, such as working in bars or entertainment
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ers do not exert the traditional social control of recommending good
jobs as reward for high grades and responsible school behavior.
In summary, one must consider carefully the interschool variation in
dropout rates alongside the low average dropout rate in Japan. It is also
important to examine how job placement statistics are constructed be-
fore American policy makers rush to the conclusion that Japanese high
schools smoothly guide all students into jobs.
Meritocratic Job Placement
As noted earlier, it is important to consider that the Japanese labor re-
cruitment regime takes place within the context of a highly stratiﬁed
secondary school system. Rosenbaum and Kariya have argued that Japa-
nese teachers privilege grades in matching students to jobs and that the
system is, therefore, highly meritocratic.8 However, the teachers I inter-
viewed stressed two other attributes in addition to grades: attendance at
school and club activities. Theseare,infact,muchcloser totheattributes
that Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis claimed 25 years ago channel
working-class youth into working-class jobs in the United States.9
Even if one does accept that grades are the most important selection
criterion used by Japanese teachers, one still must consider how the com-
petition for jobs has been structured at the institutional level. Job offers
go to the high school as a unit, and students have been rigorously sorted
into their particular school. Any student who had trouble in junior high
school or on the standardized high school entrance examination has,
therefore, circumscribed his or her future irretrievably. Prior to my in-
terviews at high schools, I had thought that, as Rosenbaum and Kariya
state, ‘‘schools compete with each other to maintain or increase their
shares of capable employees and the dependability of this supply.’’10 This
strongly implies that high schools’ reputations are based on the jobs that
they are able to secure for their graduates. If this were the case, then
students would be sorting themselves into high schools based on their
preference for entering the labor market versus continuing on to higher
education. Yet, when I asked teachers at the low-level, urban, public, gen-
eral high schools on what their school’s reputation is based, I repeatedly
heard the same answer: it is based on the number of students they send
to university. The causal argument made in the American literature that
Japanese high schools compete with one another in the market for good
jobs and, thereby, attract students based on this capacity, was not borne
out by my interviews. Instead,studentsapparentlygotoschoolswithhigh
proportions of work-bound students because those are the only schools
they can get into. This means that the incentive structure is different
from that perceived by American observers. The claim that a central as-
pect of the system is that schools use their access to local employers as a
448 Social Service Reviewbasis for competing with one another to attract students is not an accu-
rate depiction of the reality.
Conclusion
The purported efﬁciency of the highly institutionalized Japanese sys-
tem must be critically evaluated. Summary statistics on dropout rates
from Japanese high schools disguise the intricate ranking of public high
schools in each school district. The lowest ranked schools face student
retention problems not unlike those in many American public high
schools, despite the incentive (i.e., teacher recommendations of stu-
dents to employers) students have to stay in school. The efﬁciency of the
placement system also needs to be studied at the microlevel—at the level
where placement statistics are produced—so that one can determine
how many graduating seniors fall through the cracks. The proportions
of graduating seniors at low-ranking high schools for whom the school
has no information are very high in some cases, a fact that has been
missed by American educational policy makers eager to seize on Japa-
nese successes. Finally, the system’s efﬁciency should be placed in the
context of high Japanese economic growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s
and the persistence of a healthy manufacturing sector. The downturn in
the Japanese economy in the 1990s and the upturn in the post-1995
American economy offer fertile testing ground for assessing the role that
macroeconomic conditions play in both countries’ employment success
with less educated youth. Changing economic conditions in both coun-
tries offer the potential to tease out the extent to which Japanese schools
and a favorable economy share the credit for low youth unemployment.
In evaluating how meritocratic the Japanese system is, one must rec-
ognize that the hierarchical organization of Japanese high schools and
the central reliance on test scores in junior high school structure the
competition for good jobs in a way that is very foreign to Americans.
Before analyzing how teachers in Japanese high schools make recom-
mendation decisions, it is necessary to consider this ﬁrst level of screen-
ing, when the door to particular high schools is opened or shut. If the en-
trance examination and accompanying counseling regarding the school
a student should try to enter are not strongly linked to parental socioeco-
nomic background, then the degree of meritocracy at the high school
admission stage is high. But this is not entirely clear, and there are indi-
cations that this achievement-based sorting is, in fact, closely correlated
with family socioeconomic background.11 If this is the case, then it does
not make sense to claim that the job placement system is meritocratic,
even if teachers do indeed rely mainly on high school performance. The
contest has been predetermined by the fact that job offers go to schools
rather than directly to students without any intermediary.
Finally, one must take note that the Japanese job-placement system was
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network of local public employment agencies. Although I am only in the
initial stages of looking into the history of the origins of the system, it was
set up earlier in the twentieth century with at least two principal aims:
to help efﬁciently allocate labor across the country by matching labor
supply from the schools to labor demand in industry, and to protect
young people from labor exploitation. It is not a grassroots systemcreated
through school-employer partnerships. Rather, school-employer com-
munication and the tripartite arrangement among employers, public
employment agencies, and schools are dictated by the framework of
Japanese labor law that requires the public employment agency to ap-
prove employers’ requests and prohibits employers from advertising jobs
for new high school graduates on the ‘‘open market.’’ Employers must
go to the schools to recruit labor. Many of the teachers with whom I
spoke began their interview with comments along the following lines:
According to labor law, the public employment agency is the only place
that can handle the employment of new junior or senior high school
graduates; the agency then gives this task to the schools. In other words,
the practice of ﬁndingjobsfor studentsisnotnecessarilyworkthatteach-
ers want to do but work that they must do. Within this context, the pro-
visional conclusion from my ﬁeldwork is that teachers put tremendous
effort into trying to ‘‘do well’’ by their students. Likewise, the incen-
tives for students to try to perform well in school are high if teachers—
through whatever mechanism—are able to control access to many of the
good jobs in the economy. However, two of the crucial questions for the
United States are whether we think it is possible and desirable for teach-
ers to control this access and, if so, how that can be effected in local
contexts rather than through a set of national legal guidelines, as the
latter would almost certainly be politically infeasible given America’s de-
centralized educational system. These, then, are among the important
issues raised by Japan’s highly centralized job-placement system.
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